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Abstract :   
Violent extremist groups differ in many aspects - ideology, operations, and geography - but 
almost all seek and recruit disillusioned young men as fighters on their front lines. The 
ubiquity of this strategy means that young men are drawn to such groups less because of the 
groups' specific beliefs and more out of an inherent need to fulfill their identities as men. 
Policies and analysis to counter violent extremism must therefore incorporate gender analysis- 
thus "men-stream" their efforts - in order to identify factors that make men vulnerable to 
recruitment by extremist groups.  
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The multifaceted ways violent terrorist groups come to exist, operate, and flourish are rooted 
in complex geopolitical trends, which are continuously researched and debated by national 
security experts, policymakers, and development practitioners alike. However, whether ISIS in 
the Middle East, Boko Haram in West Africa, or hate groups in the West, one major 
commonality among extremist groups is that they actively identify and recruit young, 
disillusioned men as fighters on their front lines. The ubiquity of this strategy suggests there is 
an inherent lure for young men to join such groups, one that goes beyond the groups’ 
respective ideologies.  
This policy brief argues young men are more likely drawn into joining extremist groups when 
they are struggling to fulfill their perceived needs and identities as men, rather than through an 
inherent hatred of specific groups or radical ideologies. Countering Violence Extremism (CVE) 
analyses and approaches must therefore incorporate considerations of masculinities - gender 
“men-stream” their efforts - if anti-terrorism policies are to truly address the root causes of the 
prevalence of violent extremism. “Men-streaming”, a term derived by scholars- most notably 
popularized by Chant and Gutman (2002)- from the development and public policy concept of 
gender mainstreaming, is a process of assessing and developing policy with particular attention 
to, and emphasis on, its impact on men and young boys. In the context of CVE, this requires an 
understanding of the role that dominant societal constructs of masculinity play in influencing 
individuals’ choice of participating in violent activities.  
“Men-Streaming”: Considering Men as Gendered Beings 
Masculinities, that is, the study of cross-cultural social constructs that define what it means to 
be a man, has traditionally received scant attention from activists and policy makers. This is 
because most programs aimed at promoting gender equality have traditionally focused 
primarily on promoting women’s rights. When men were included in the discourse, it was 
mostly in the role of the “problematic male”: the obstacle in the way of women’s empowerment 
(Cornwall, 2000). Some feminists have justified this omission on the grounds that resources 
devoted to gender should be going to women to redress existing and longstanding gender 
inequalities (Peretz, 2016.)   
Though international agreements, such as the 1995 Beijing Declaration, have highlighted the 
need to involve men in the promotion of gender equality (Ruxton, 2004), engaging with men on 
gender issues has only been pursued recently. This shift in thinking came about due to the 
realization that the success of gender equality efforts was limited in their focus solely on 
women (Wanner & Wedham, 2015.) Development practitioners and gender equality advocates 
came to see including the male side of gender as necessary for two reasons. First, achieving 
transformational change on gender equality is not possible without engaging men. Second, men 
also experience issues related to their gender that have a significant impact on their well-being 
and life choices (Wanner & Wedham, 2015, Bannon & Correia, 2006; Chant & Gutman, 2002).   
While masculinities differ across cultural, geographical, and political contexts, there is usually a 
dominant and normative form of masculinity that is upheld by a society as the standard by 
which all men are judged (Bannon & Correia, 2006). Known as hegemonic masculinity, it 
encompasses a normative set of behaviors, actions, values, and practices that men are 
conditioned to adhere to in order to be seen as proper men in their community. Certain 
capabilities are valued over others, including: being able to secure work and provide for one’s 
family; the ability to be sexually active, marry, and have children; and the ability to enjoy a 
sense of belonging and respect among one’s peers and community. The pursuit of these 
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capabilities dictates many men’s actions and the way they live their lives. Men who deviate 
away from these established norms often face ridicule and social exclusion by their peers and 
other members of their community (Barker & Ricardo, 2005). They are also often confronted 
with a divide between the role society expects of them and their own realities. Men who are 
poor, socioeconomically marginalized, disabled, or affected by conflict, are least likely to be able 
to fulfill the aforementioned capabilities deemed favorable by their society (Bannon & Correia, 
2006).  
When men are unable to fulfill these expectations, they may turn to destructive and illicit 
means to do so. This happens because men do not see an alternative other than living up to the 
expectations set upon them by their environment and those around them (Bannon & Correia, 
2006). Men may resort to illicit behavior to achieve a sense of dominance over their 
surroundings, as well as vent their frustrations with the status quo. Studies have shown that 
men who uphold such hegemonic views of masculinity are more likely to engage in actions such 
as criminal activity, drug use, violence against others, and unsafe sexual practices (Barker & 
Ricardo, 2005; Barker, Heilman, & Harrison, 2017; Robb, Featherstone, Ruxton, & Ward, 
2015). 
The Role of Masculinities in Violent Extremism 
Organizations involved in CVE have long supported the notion that young men fuel the rise of 
extremist groups. The presence of a “youth bulge” in a population has been documented as a 
predictor of societal unrest. For example, Urdal (2011) has found that the probability of armed 
conflict is 150% greater when 15-24-year-olds make up 35% of a country’s population, as is the 
case in many developing countries. However, the gendered nuances regarding the way men are 
involved in such conflicts are not well examined. When gender is considered, it is again usually 
in the context of women and the way they are targeted as instruments of war, as seen with the 
example of Boko Haram’s use of rape and abduction of women in Nigeria (Zenn & Pearson, 
2014). Even donor strategies on CVE without an articulated gender strategy still only see half 
the story. USAID (2016) calls for gender considerations in their CVE strategy, but only in the 
context of increased attention to “women’s perceptions of violence and security” (p.10), while 
also engaging women as stakeholders as certainly necessary endeavors. 
Given that men are more likely to choose violent action if they face challenges to fulfilling their 
societal roles as men, one can expect the presence of such barriers to be indicative of a greater 
vulnerability to radicalization. Mapping out these barriers in the context of “push” and “pull” 
factors towards extremism would thus present a useful analysis of the conditions needed for 
men to be radicalized. Hasan (2012) provides useful definitions of push and pull factors in this 
context: push factors are the negative factors in one’s “societal environment” that aid in 
“pushing” them toward violent extremism, while “pull” factors are the perceived positive 
features of extremist groups that pull men towards joining. The following are examples of both 
types of factors that may act as determinants for joining a violent extremist group.   
Push Factors       
Lack of economic opportunities. Poverty and unemployment are some of the biggest risk 
factors for men’s radicalization. The inability to work and provide for oneself and family 
represents the ultimate emasculation in many societies, and it has been shown to have a 
negative impact on men’s health, self-image, and general well-being (Barker, 2005). This can be 
exacerbated if men are dependent on others for support. Joining an extremist group can 
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therefore be a primarily financial endeavor. For example, former al-Shabab fighters in Somalia 
cited the ability to provide for themselves and not be reliant on relatives as a key motivator for 
joining (Hassan, 2012).  
Social marginalization. Men who face sociocultural barriers within their communities are 
more likely to be disengaged from them, and so are more vulnerable to radicalization (Jasko, 
LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2017). Such barriers can relate to race, age, religion, ethnicity, or any 
other social identity. Men can feel marginalized, even in contexts where the opportunities to 
fulfill their roles as men are present, if they do not enjoy equal access to those opportunities 
based on their social identities. Extremists who were born in the West provide an ideal 
example of this. It was long believed that societies with fairly robust human rights and 
freedoms, like those of many Western countries, would make an unlikely breeding ground for 
potential terrorists (Gelfand, LaFee, Fahey, & Feinberg, 2013). This theory was contradicted 
by terrorist events in the West, and the fact that many of the perpetrators were citizens or 
residents of the same countries they attacked. However, just because those freedoms were 
present does not mean the individuals in question had real access to them, as the 
aforementioned barriers are still present for many individuals, even in many Western countries. 
This discrimination furthers social disengagement, which in turn makes individuals more 
vulnerable to radicalization (OSCE, 2014).  
Lack of marriage prospects. In many societies, one is not fully a man until he is a husband 
and father. Unmarried men are often relegated to a lower status in many societies, and often 
have lower rates of employment (Moffitt, 2012), income (Pollman-Schult, 2011; Ashwin & 
Isupova, 2014), educational attainment (Fry et al., 2010), and land ownership (Koopman, 2009). 
They may even be perceived as being homosexual, causing further tensions (Bannon and 
Correia, 2006). At the same time, men also face increasing difficulties in finding spouses. The 
phenomenon of “missing females” due to offspring selection in many parts of the world has led 
to a dearth of potential brides (“The worldwide war,” 2010.) Migration and increased education 
and employment opportunities for women are other contributing factors that exacerbate the 
marriage disparity. The resulting imbalance in the marriage market has been shown to create a 
surplus of males that are more prone to violent actions (Hudson & Den Boer, 2002).  Extremist 
groups have keyed in on this phenomenon and use marriage as a recruitment tool. Groups like 
IS and Boko Haram actively recruit and/or kidnap women and girls to be married off to their 
fighters.  
Pull Factors  
A sense of belonging. Being a part of a group and forming interpersonal relationships are 
essential human interactions. These experiences may not be made available to men who are 
ostracized by their community for their inability to fulfill their roles as men, and/or are socially 
marginalized based on their social identities. This may cause men to seek acceptance and social 
connection from groups elsewhere. There is psychological evidence to suggest that the need for 
belonging is strong enough for individuals to accept the goals of others as their own (Khader et 
al.). Groups like IS have exploited this in their messaging, calling for the unison of all Muslims, 
regardless of race or ethnicity (Khader et al.). In doing so, they appeal to men who do not 
experience such acceptance in their own communities.  
Defense of one’s identity. All extremist groups call for war as a means of defense against the 
destruction of shared values, calling on men to be defenders of religion, country, ethnicity, or 
way of life. Global terrorism is thus not so much a traditional contest of territory and 
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resources, but rather a radical defense of one’s identity (Bannon & Correia, 2006). It has even 
been argued that the call to jihad is borne less out of orthodox religiosity, and more as a means 
of redressing the past wrongs enacted on Muslims by the West (Aslam, 2012).  
The search for respect. A soldier is generally seen as a being in a position of power and honor 
in many societies. Joining an extremist group can therefore be a way to achieve elevated 
prominence in one’s society. Former fighters of al-Shabab cited honor as the biggest draw to 
joining the group, as membership ensured fear, respect, and attention from women (Hassan, 
2012). Being a fighter therefore allowed these men to bypass the traditional limitations of age 
and wealth in achieving a swift fulfillment of the hegemonic male status. 
Recommendations     
Curbing the appeal of violent extremist groups will require addressing the discussed “push” and 
“pull” factors at all levels. More research is needed on the application of men’s gender 
perspectives in conflict and post-conflict settings. Such analysis is difficult, not least because 
most men have never been engaged in discussion about their experiences as men (Barker, 
2005). There are three general approaches that can be undertaken to “men stream” CVE 
policies: 
Learning from existing men’s programs. Methodologies from men’s programs addressing 
violence against women may provide valuable tools and lessons to crafting effective CVE 
policies. Some successful examples include the White Ribbon Campaign (Kaufman, 2001) and 
men’s clubs against violence (Tu-Anh, Trang, & Tam, 2013). Such efforts are effective because 
they provide a sense of belonging, a space for men to deconstruct their preconceptions of 
masculinity, and/or an opportunity for men to evaluate their harmful behaviors without 
judgement, all of which are needed to foster true behavior change. Social media campaigns 
should also be pursued to promote positive masculinity, gender equality, and expressions of 
one’s identity (Helmus, York, & Chalk, 2013).  
Engagement of local stakeholders. Countering CVE requires the inclusion of local actors 
such as NGOs, religious groups, community youth organizations, women’s groups, recreation 
and sports clubs, and other civil society groups, working at the grassroots level, as well as 
young people themselves. Previous policies on CVE have too often created stigma and further 
resentment, as evidenced by “counter radicalization” interventions in Europe (Chin, Gharaibeh, 
Woodham, & Deeb, 2016). Incorporating community actors into the design and 
implementation of CVE efforts will go a long way to correcting this, as well as ensuring such 
efforts will be effective, sustainable, and embraced at the local level. An inclusive and 
participatory planning process will also help to identify specific factors that contribute to the 
marginalization of young men and to develop the best means for addressing them.  
Addressing structural barriers. On the national level, structural barriers that lead to social 
marginalization must be eradicated, particularly in developing countries with large youth 
populations. The most effective ways to pursue this goal is to expand education and 
employment programs. Providing school and vocational programs that support young people 
to develop employable skills, while at the same time expanding employment opportunities for 
youth as they graduate, will reduce socioeconomic incentives for joining an extremist group. 
Investing in youth entrepreneurship in both the formal and informal sector has been identified 
as an area of importance, especially for CVE efforts in East Africa (ACSS, 2012). Such efforts 
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will also unlock a vital source of growth and poverty reduction for many countries, further 
reducing the draw extremist groups have for young men.   
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